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This paper  examines  bias  in  online  charitable  microﬁnance  lending.  We  ﬁnd  that  charitable
lenders on a  large  peer-to-peer  online  microﬁnance  website  appear  to favor  more  attractive,
lighter-skinned,  and  less  obese  borrowers.  Borrowers  who  appear  more  needy,  honest  and
creditworthy  also  receive  funding  more  quickly.  These  effects  are  quantitatively  signiﬁcant:
Borrowers  with  beauty  one  standard  deviation  above  average  are  treated  as  though  they
are requesting  approximately  11% less  money.  Statistical  discrimination  does  not appear  to
explain  our  ﬁndings,  as these  borrower  attributes  are  uncorrelated  with  loan  performance
or  borrower  enterprise  performance.  The  evidence  suggests  implicit  bias  could  explain  our
ﬁndings: more  experienced  lenders,  who  may  rely  less  on  implicit  attitudes,  appear  to
exhibit less  bias  than inexperienced  lenders.
©  2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
A large literature in economics examines discrimination in a variety of market settings. Much of the literature has focused
on discrimination on the basis of demographic attributes such as race, ethnicity and gender. More recently, studies have
found a link between beauty and the labor market (Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994; Biddle and Hamermesh, 1998; Mobius
and Rosenblat, 2006) and credit access (Ravina, 2012). While such evidence of discrimination has been robustly documented
in market settings, it remains an open question as to whether discrimination plays a role in non-market settings such as
charitable giving. In this study, we investigate whether systematic lender biases on the basis of beauty, weight and skin color
play a role in charitable decision-making. We  examine discrimination in a new setting – direct philanthropy on Kiva.org, an
online peer-to-peer microﬁnance website.1 We  show that discrimination in direct philanthropy exists, and we argue that
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1 A number of other papers have utilized the Kiva data; a short discussion is provided in the literature review.
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t is increasingly relevant given the rapid growth in online direct giving, and given the extent to which private giving is
ncreasingly substituting for institutional giving, which may  be driven by very different preferences.
Our study departs from much of the literature on discrimination and charitable giving by using large-scale observational
ata of the decisions made by tens of thousands of actual charitable lenders, choosing over thousands of real charitable
ecipients. Previous studies have been based on experiments conducted on laboratory participants (Andreoni and Petrie,
008), consumer research panels (Fong and Luttmer, 2009), and on households canvassed door-to-door (Landry et al., 2006;
ist and Price, 2009). While participants in the literature are representative of the general population, they are different
rom actual donors. In contrast with the literature, our paper examines how biases shape the intensive margin behavior of
onors who give to international charitable causes. We  examine how donor-perceived attractiveness, weight, skin color,
nd other characteristics affect charitable giving decisions made on a large sample of charitable recipients drawn from many
eveloping countries. We  circumvent typical omitted variables concerns that plague most observational studies because
ur data capture virtually all the information donors have access to.
The online international development donors we study comprise a growing and inﬂuential share of the overall charitable
arket. In the United Kingdom, charities focusing on international development rank at the top of the income tables, taking
p to two-ﬁfths of all private giving in some years (Atkinson et al., 2012). In aggregate, private giving from individual donors
omprises 73% of the $298 billion charitable giving market in the United States (Giving USA, 2012). Online giving in particular
as grown more rapidly than traditional forms of giving in recent years (Frostenson et al., 2013). Online giving often departs
rom traditional giving by allowing donors to give directly to a particular individual, group, or project, instead of having their
iving distributed by a non-proﬁt organization or government.2
The growth of online directed giving matters when the exhibited preferences or biases of individual donors differ signif-
cantly from those of institutions and governments, and when such preferences have an impact on social outcomes. Donor
references and funding ﬂows matter because microﬁnance institutions depend on donor subsidies, obtain a negative return
n assets, and are generally not self-sufﬁcient (Cull et al., 2007). Even the Nobel-prize winning Grameen Bank depends on
apital subsidies from donors and would have to raise interest rates charged substantially without such assistance (Murdoch,
999). This dependence on capital subsidies provides strong incentives for microﬁnance institutions (and other development
riented institutions) to focus on projects or clients who  suit the preferences of donors – even if those preferences are based
n physical characteristics such as beauty or weight.
Our paper’s contribution is to document and interpret the causes of such exhibited individual donor preferences. As List
2011) points out, there is little evidence on how different types of agents pursue the same broad charitable goals. After the
nd of the Cold War, ofﬁcial development assistance from the major international donors and multilateral aid institutions
ppears to have been channeled increasingly toward poorer, more democratic countries (Dollar and Levin, 2006). However,
t is not clear that private individuals in those same donor countries share these preferences; Desai and Kharas (2009) show
hat donations on Kiva appear to favor relatively rich and less democratic countries instead. Analyses that simply assume
rivate and public sources of aid are substitutable in aggregate risk generating misleading conclusions if these differing
references are not considered.
Kiva facilitates the transfer of funds from charitable lenders in developed countries to microﬁnance recipients in less
eveloped countries. Although Kiva was only founded in 2005, by February 2012, it had facilitated the loan of almost $300
illion US dollars, from nearly 700,000 individual donors, to more than 700,000 microﬁnance borrowers. Kiva facilitates
oans by working with local microﬁnance institutions (MFI) to screen potential borrowers. When a suitable borrower or
roup of borrowers is identiﬁed, Kiva works with the MFI  to create a loan proﬁle on the Kiva Internet platform. The loan
roﬁle includes a picture of the borrower, a brief biography, loan purpose, loan amount and repayment schedule. The proﬁles
lso provide detailed information on the partner MFI  such as their risk rating, tenure with Kiva, the number and volume of
oans made and the delinquency rate of previous loans.
Potential lenders access loan proﬁles through the Kiva website and choose entrepreneurs they wish to support. Kiva
ggregates the small loans provided by individual lenders to meet the loan amount requested by the borrower. Lenders
n Kiva receive no interest on their loans, but are still subject to default risk and exchange rate risk. While borrowers
re charged interest, this is retained by the local MFI and is not remitted to the Kiva lender. Kiva lenders are essentially
roviding subsidized, interest-free loans to the partner MFIs. Although each loan has a low risk of default (about 1.8% during
he sample period), the majority of lenders make more than one loan. The average number of loans made by lenders in
ur sample is 16 (with a standard deviation of 94 loans), suggesting that the average lender in our sample faces roughly a
5% chance of having at least one loan default. Thus lenders forgo the use of their capital for the duration of the loan, bear
redit risks, and in practice, often do not withdraw their funds from Kiva even after loans are repaid.3 For these reasons,
ender behavior has more in common with charitable giving than investing, and as such, we  use the terms donor and lender
nterchangeably.
2 “Directed” gifts may  still be fungible if they relieve a charitable organization’s budget constraint with respect to unrestricted donations.
3 According to Matt Flannery, Kiva’s co-founder, “They (lenders) are just keeping the (repaid) money in their [Kiva] account. Maybe they didn’t know it
as  a loan. Maybe they thought it was a donation.” (Kiva: Improving People’s Lives, One Small Loan at a Time. Knowledge@Wharton Podcast, May  28th
008  (Kiva, 2008).)
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The ‘direct-giving’ context on Kiva means that our study captures the determinants of funding decisions from donors
who are interested in making a speciﬁc impact with their gifts.4 Such altruistic motivations are represented in Atkinson’s
(2009) ‘identiﬁcation’ model, which assumes people give because they believe their gifts will have an impact on speciﬁc
recipients or causes.5 We  assume Kiva lenders face two considerations. First, they care about the social impact of their loan,
and should prefer borrowers that maximize social impact. Second, lenders should care about enterprise proﬁtability and
risk, since recovery of the loan principal allows re-gifting of the loan. As virtually all loans on Kiva eventually receive full
funding, we analyze the speed with which loans are funded as a proxy for the relative attractiveness of a given loan.6 Since
Kiva lenders often face more than a thousand different charitable loans to choose from, a loan that is funded more quickly
should have a combination of attributes that lenders ﬁnd more attractive.
We  start by examining how lenders respond to objective loan characteristics or ‘hard’ information such as loan amount,
country of origin, MFI  performance and MFI  default risk in making funding decisions. Next, we examine whether lenders’
decisions are also inﬂuenced by physical characteristics such as gender, attractiveness, weight and skin color. We  also include
‘soft’ information such as perceived neediness, honesty and creditworthiness. Our empirical analysis is a test for ‘disparate
treatment’ of loan recipients, examining whether certain types of borrowers are treated differently holding constant other
dimensions.
We ﬁnd that donors discriminate on the basis of attractiveness, weight and skin color. A one standard deviation increase
in assessed attractiveness is associated with a reduction in time to full funding of approximately 11%, while a one standard
deviation increase in assessed physique (more overweight) is associated with an increase in funding time of about 12%.
The corresponding funding time increase for borrowers with skin color one standard deviation darker is about 8%. For
comparison, a ten percent increase in the loan amount requested (approximately $70) is associated with an increase in
funding time of about 13%. Therefore, borrowers who are one standard deviation more attractive (or more overweight,
or darker-skinned) are treated by the market as though they were asking for $60 less (or $65 more, or $40 more). These
estimates are economically signiﬁcant when compared to the average loan amount of about $700. These effects are robust to
a wide range of controls including loan characteristics, country ﬁxed effects, MFI  ﬁxed effects, economic sector and business
activity ﬁxed effects, and ﬁxed effects for the date the loan is posted. We  also ﬁnd strong evidence that female borrowers
are funded faster.
We next investigate potential explanations for these patterns of discrimination. One hypothesis is that lenders statistically
discriminate on observable borrower characteristics that are correlated with unobserved underlying productivity or default
risk (Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973). Although this is a charitable setting, donors may  still care about default risk because a
non-defaulting enterprise is likely to have greater social impact and preserves capital for other recipients. To evaluate this
hypothesis, we examine data on the performance of the loan. The average default rate of all Kiva loans is very low and
our sample’s default rate is about 1.8%.7 However, we  ﬁnd no evidence that borrower physical characteristics signiﬁcantly
predict loan default, once other material loan characteristics are controlled for. This is inconsistent with the hypothesis of
lender statistical discrimination on the basis of default risk, which would predict that less-preferred borrower attributes are
correlated with higher risk.
Nevertheless, lenders may  also care about the overall proﬁtability of the enterprise even if there is little risk of the loan
defaulting. The beauty literature has long found an association between physical attractiveness, labor market outcomes
(Biddle and Hamermesh, 1998; Mobius and Rosenblat, 2006), and productivity in customer-oriented positions (Hamermesh
and Biddle, 1994; Pfann et al., 2000). Accordingly, we expect lenders to statistically discriminate on beauty more when
the borrower belongs to an industry such as Services or Retail where business productivity depends highly on appearance,
but less when the borrower is in an industry where appearance is less important, such as Construction, Manufacturing and
Transport, or Agriculture. We  ﬁnd the attractiveness premium to be similar across all economic sectors. Overall, our evidence
is inconsistent with statistical discrimination, both on the basis of beauty-related productivity differentials and on physical
characteristics predicting default risk.If our ﬁndings are not readily explained by statistical discrimination, what remains is a pattern of bias – explicit or implicit
– that presumably reﬂects the preferences or attitudes of lenders. While economists have traditionally modeled taste-based
discrimination as the result of conscious choices (Becker, 1979), psychologists argue that discriminatory behavior may  also
4 As our dataset only covers the lending behavior of a sample of individuals on Kiva, we  do not examine why an individual gives at all, or why they
choose Kiva instead of alternative channels. Nonetheless, the population of lenders on Kiva is substantial, standing at nearly 700,000 lenders on Kiva as of
February 2012, drawn from virtually every country worldwide.
5 In Atkinson (2009), donor beliefs need not be consistent with the reality that private small-scale donations are unlikely to have a measurable impact.
What is important is that donors perceive they can make a difference in a particular recipient’s life through their giving. Indeed, charitable causes generally
emphasize this concept in their marketing even if the reality is a little different.
6 Although all projects on Kiva are eventually funded, biases affecting time-to-funding still have welfare implications. Other charitable websites which
solicit individual donations are much less successful than Kiva. For example, on Globalgiving.org, which ﬁnances traditional development projects, typical
times  to full funding are in the order of months or more, although this may  be attributable to Kiva controlling funding requests more strictly (Desai and
Kharas, 2009). Donor biases can also be expected to inﬂuence how charitable agencies choose clients and projects, especially if they intend to use online
appeals for funding.
7 One explanation for this low rate is that MFIs were allowed to cover entrepreneurs’ defaults in order to keep their published default rates
low.  While this practice is now forbidden by Kiva, it was  allowed throughout the period from 2005 to 2009. See http://www.kiva.org/updates/kiva/
2010/02/10/update-on-recent-change-in-default.html.
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e driven by implicit attitudes and unconscious mental associations (Baron and Banaji, 2006). Implicit attitudes are more
ikely to inﬂuence behavior when decision makers face a high degree of information overload and ambiguity regarding
heir choices (Bertrand et al., 2005). The literature on choice overload ﬁnds that individuals faced with too many choices,
n various settings, behave as though they are cognitively burdened and make qualitatively different decisions (Iyengar and
epper, 2000; Iyengar and Kamenica, 2010). We  argue that implicit discrimination may  characterize lending decisions on
iva, because of the dizzying array of choices available and the lack of any obvious decision criteria for making a funding
hoice. We  provide two pieces of indirect evidence that appear consistent with this hypothesis – ﬁrst, we show that lenders
ith less experience on Kiva are more likely to exhibit bias in funding loans. This is consistent with evidence from the widely
sed implicit association test showing task experience signiﬁcantly reduces implicit bias effect sizes (Nosek et al., 2005),
nd suggests implicit discrimination may  explain part of our ﬁndings. Second, we show that as demand for credit increases,
nexperienced lenders are even more likely to exhibit bias in funding loans, consistent with the cognitive burden of choice
verload leading to increased reliance on implicit attitudes.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a literature review. Section 3 describes the data and
rovides additional details about Kiva. Section 4 discusses the effects of borrower attributes on loan funding times and loan
erformance. Section 5 explores the relationship between lender experience and lender bias. Section 6 concludes.
. Literature review
This paper adds to a recent, but growing literature that explores racial and beauty biases in charitable giving in the
aboratory and in the ﬁeld. Fong and Luttmer (2009) experimentally vary racial information in photographs of Hurricane
atrina victims shown to potential donors and ﬁnd that respondents who  report feeling close to their own  racial or ethnic
roup give substantially more when victims are of the same race. Landry et al. (2006) ﬁnd that more attractive women
olicitors are able to secure more and larger donations in door-to-door fundraising experiments. Similarly, List and Price
2009) ﬁnd that minority solicitors are less likely to obtain a contribution, whether approaching a majority or minority
ousehold. In the laboratory setting, with public goods games, Andreoni and Petrie (2008) show that subjects are more
ikely to cooperate in the presence of beautiful people even though more beautiful people are not actually more coop-
rative. While these studies support the link between physical appearance and charitable decision-making, they largely
ocus on laboratory subjects (Andreoni and Petrie, 2008) or use a small number of solicitors (Landry et al., 2006) drawn
rom American college students. Our research question is also not directly addressed by the existing work on discrimi-
ation in microﬁnance, which focuses on bias in credit allocation at the MFI  level (Agier and Szafarz, 2013; Labie et al.,
010).
On a broader level, this paper is also closely related to a series of papers documenting discrimination in Pros-
er.com, a for-proﬁt peer-to-peer online credit market in the United States. Recent work shows that lenders in this
arket appear to discriminate based on borrower attributes such as race and physical appearance (Pope and Snydor,
011; Ravina, 2012; Theseira, 2008), raising concerns that this reliance on “soft information” might undermine the abil-
ty of credit markets to allocate funds according to creditworthiness (Iyer et al., 2009). The Kiva market itself is also
he subject of active study, with research on the determinants of funding decisions (Ly and Mason, 2012), how trans-
ction costs and social distance affect funding decisions (Meer and Rigbi, 2013) and on how social identity affects
haritable behavior (Liu et al., 2012). However, we are not aware of signiﬁcant prior evidence on whether and how
nternational charitable donors discriminate on physical traits, in philanthropy directed at recipients in developing
ountries.
. Data
.1. Details on Kiva.org
Kiva has been in operation since 2005, with loans posted for funding since February 2006. From 2006 through 2010, Kiva
xperienced rapid growth in loans posted and dollars loaned, as shown in Fig. 1. Whilst in January 2007, less than a thousand
oans were posted monthly, by the end of 2009, nearly eight thousand loans were posted each month, for an average monthly
oan volume of $5 million. The average amount requested per loan was $700 and did not vary signiﬁcantly during the period
007–2009. In February 2012, Kiva reported a total loan volume in excess of $300 million dollars (since inception), and a
lient base of more than 700,000 borrowers.
Kiva partners local microﬁnance institutions (MFIs) in developing countries. To become a ﬁeld partner, MFIs have to meet
iva’s minimum requirements and pass an on-site due diligence where Kiva personnel assess the stability, governance and
isk proﬁle of each MFI. Based on the MFI’s tenure with Kiva and its ﬁnancial strength, each MFI  is assigned an upper limit
n the amount that its borrowers can request from Kiva each month. Potential borrowers are screened by local MFIs who
re also responsible for disbursing the initial loan amount. In the majority of cases, MFIs have already disbursed the full loan
mount to borrowers before their loan requests are posted on the Kiva website. Therefore, while Kiva gives the impression
o charitable lenders that their decisions directly affect whether and how soon an individual borrower gets funding, the ﬁne
rint reveals that a lender’s decision generally has no impact on an individual borrower. Loan requests are listed on the Kiva
238 C. Jenq et al. / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 119 (2015) 234–253Fig. 1. Number of loans posted monthly and time to funding on Kiva from January 2007 to December 2009.
website for up to 30 days, and the MFI  only receives the funds if the loan is fully funded within that period. It is very rare for
loan requests not to be fully funded.8
Borrowers and MFIs agree on the repayment schedule and terms of the loan. While lenders on the Kiva platform receive
no interest on their loans, MFIs do charge the borrowers interest. On average, the combined loan fees and interest paid by
borrowers are about 38 percent per annum. MFIs are free to determine interest rates, but Kiva monitors interest rates as a
key evaluation criterion for determining whether to continue partnering with an MFI. Field partners self-report to Kiva the
interest rates that they charge borrowers, and the average rate charged by that MFI  across borrowers is reported on the Kiva
website, but not the individual borrower-speciﬁc rate.9
3.2. Sample data
Our sample consists of 6977 loans ﬁrst posted on Kiva during June 2009. This month was  chosen to represent a typical
month of operations from the period where Kiva had already established mainstream status. We  focused on only one month
for our analysis as we wished to ensure a high quality of coding for each borrower’s physical and subjective attributes. More
details on our coding procedure are discussed in the next subsection. While Kiva began operations in 2005, Kiva experienced
extremely rapid growth from 2005 to 2008, as shown in Fig. 1. Kiva’s growth was  accompanied by high-proﬁle media events
that attracted waves of new lenders, raising concerns that a sample drawn from that period might be less representative. We
also wished to avoid drawing data from year-end holiday periods that might experience seasonal ﬂuctuations in charitable
activity. Finally, we needed a sufﬁcient period of time to elapse from the loan origination date, so we  could evaluate ﬁnal
loan default rates.
Table 1 outlines the characteristics of loans from 2007 to 2009, as well as from our June 2009 sample. In the 2007–2009
data, the mean loan size is $701 and the median loan size is $550. Loans in excess of $1000 are rare, with the 95th percentile
loan amount being $1600 and the largest recorded loan being $10,000. The mean time to funding is 3838 minutes or about
two and a half days, with the median time to funding signiﬁcantly lower at 613 minutes or about 10 hours. A small number of
loans take a week or longer to fund; the 95th percentile time to funding is 23,376 minutes, or 16 days. The median loan term
is 9 months and the mean loan term is similar; the longest loan terms available on Kiva are for 36 months. Our speciﬁc sample
month of June 2009 appears similar to the broader data. We  were able to track the performance of loans until September
2011, when close to 98% of loans were paid in full, and 1.8% of loans were in default. A small number of loans were classiﬁed
as delinquent, in-repayment or refunded.10
8 Pre-screening by MFIs implies that the borrowers we observe on Kiva are positively selected for characteristics that MFIs expect lenders to prefer.
While the MFI  can choose the types of borrowers they prefer to loan to, MFIs are not allowed to selectively post loans on Kiva. Therefore, our dataset covers
the  universe of loans made by the MFIs during the sample period.
9 During the period our data covers, this information was not reported on the borrower’s main loan listing and had to be accessed by clicking a link to
view  more information on the MFI. In recent years (not included in our sample period), after the Kiva platform was revised, substantially more information
about  the ﬁeld partner became available on the borrower’s main loan listing.
10 Our data contains the status of every loan posted on the Kiva website during our sample period. The loan status indicates if the loan is due, repaid,
currently in repayment, delinquent, or defaulted. Information on the status of all loans ever posted can be accessed directly from the Kiva website.
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Table  1
Summary statistics of loan listing characteristics.
Full data 2007–2009 Data in analysis sample (June 2009)
All data in sample Individuals Group
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Mean
Loan Data
Time to funding (minutes) 3838.24 (7762.98) 5710.84 (8882.49) 5265.42 8825.21
Loan  amount (USD) 701.12 (622) 723 (786) 602 1575
Loan  term (months) 11.53 (4.42) 10.93 (4.30) 11.14 9.44
Loan  status as of September 2011
Paid 0.98 (0.14) 0.98 0.99
Default  0.02 (0.13) 0.02 0.01
Delinquent 0.001 (0.03) 0.001 0.00
In  repayment/refunded 0.002 (0.04) 0.002 0.00
Microﬁnance Institution Partner Data
Delinquency rate 3.94 (11.51) 2.67 (9.28) 1.99 7.41
Default  rate 1.04 (5.90) 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 0.00
GDP  per capita, USD PPP 4165.50 (3557) 3926 (4251) 4043 3112
MFI  risk rating (0–5 scale) 3.68 (1.36) 3.99 (0.92) 3.97 4.08
Fraction of total loans to
Female borrowers 0.78 (0.40) 0.78 (0.40) 0.77 0.90
Group  borrowers 0.12 (0.32) 0.13 (0.33) 0 1
Count % of Ttl Count % of Ttl % of Ttl % of Ttl
Agriculture 27,188 17.44 1233 17.67 18.91 9.05
Food  45,477 29.17 2093 30 30.52 26.35
Services 13,384 8.59 577 8.27 7.57 13.17
Construction, mfg. and tpt. 10,840 6.96 466 6.67 6.65 6.88
Retail  36,681 23.53 1724 24.71 23.85 30.7
Others  22,320 14.3 884 12.67 12.51 13.86
Geographic location
Africa 46,571 29.87 2149 30.8 30.18 35.17
Asia  54,093 34.70 2707 38.8 40.17 29.21
Central America 11,745 7.53 571 8.18 8.76 4.12
Eastern Europe 2661 1.71 58 0.83 0.95
Middle East 4417 2.83 204 2.92 2.77 4.01
North  America 7675 4.92 169 2.42 1.67 7.67
South  America 28,728 18.43 1119 16.04 15.5 19.82
Observations 155,890 6977 6104 873
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lotes: Summary statistics are based on all loans posted on Kiva during the respective time periods of 2007–2009 (full data) and June 2009 (analysis sample).
oans  on Kiva are classiﬁed according to 16 economic sectors. We  report separately the top economic sector classiﬁcations, and condense under “others”
he  classiﬁcations of arts, clothing, education, entertainment, green, health, housing, personal use and wholesale. “Construction, mfg. and tpt.” is likewise
ondensed from the classiﬁcations of construction, manufacturing, and transport.
Information on ex-ante credit risks is only available at the MFI  level. Thus, all borrowers from the same MFI  are reported
ith the same credit risk characteristics. In addition, no quantitative data is available on the economic conditions of the
orrower except for the borrower’s country GDP per capita in purchasing power parity terms. Based on this data, the
verage delinquency rate is 3.94%, while the median delinquency rate is 0% indicating that MFIs with 0% delinquency issue
he majority of loans.11 The average reported default rate of MFIs in the sample is very low, and underestimates the actual
efault rate of loans in the sample which is approximately 1.8%.12 The mean PPP GDP per capita in borrowers’ countries is
4200; 95% of all loans are issued to borrowers in countries with GDPs less than $11,100. Kiva also provides a 0 to 5 point risk
ating for each MFI, displayed to potential lenders using a 5-star graphic. The star rating reﬂects the risk of MFI  institutional
efault. The median rating is 4 points (mean rating approximately 3.7), indicating that the majority of loans are issued from
FIs that Kiva assesses to be relatively low-risk.
Prospective lenders may  search for loans through various methods. The main loan listing page presents a summary of
ctive loans that includes, for each loan, a picture of the borrower, the entrepreneur’s name and loan activity, the loan amount
nd percent funded, the name of the country and MFI  as well as the ﬁrst two  to three lines of the textual description from
he main borrower proﬁle page. The order of the list is determined by the popularity of the loan, with more popular requests
laced further up the list. Loans are categorized according to the gender of the borrower, economic sector and geographic
11 Because Kiva.org previously did not explicitly prohibit MFIs from making repayments on behalf of defaulted borrowers, the data on delinquency and
efaults provided may  not reﬂect true loan performance. Nevertheless, in our sample, the average default rate across all loans is about 1.8%, ensuring that
he  MFIs do not repay all loans that default.
12 This discrepancy between the MFI  default rate and the individual loan default rate likely arises because the MFI  default rate is an average taken over a
onger  time period and the default rates of loans were signiﬁcantly lower previously.
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region. Lenders can use these categories and a text search ﬁeld to sort and ﬁlter for loans that match any desired keywords
or phrases. Loans can also be sorted based on popularity, loan amount, amount left, repayment term, and whether the loan
is expiring soon or recently added. Clicking on a loan brings up the borrower’s proﬁle page, where the loan-speciﬁc details
discussed above are displayed. Appendix Fig. 1 provides a screenshot of both the main lending page and the borrower page.
The last two panels of Table 1 show that the distribution of loans by economic sector and geographic region are broadly
similar between the complete data and our coded sample. The most important sectors are Agriculture, Food (referring to
food-based enterprises such as grocery stores and restaurants rather than personal consumption) and Retail, which together
account for two-thirds of all loans. Slightly more than one-third of all loans are to countries in Asia, followed by Africa and
South America. The remaining regions of the world make up less than 20% of all loans. Loans in our sample are also broadly
similar in terms of key listing characteristics such as the loan amount, loan term, MFI  delinquency rate, MFI  risk rating and
the fraction of loans to female borrowers and groups. This again suggests that our sample month is reasonably representative
of the broader data.
3.3. Coding procedures for physical and subjective borrower attributes from photographs
To obtain measures of physical and subjective borrower attributes, the borrower photographs were reviewed by under-
graduate research assistants. Each research assistant was  asked to code and quantify certain more objective qualities of each
photograph, such as the number and type of people in the photograph, gender, physique, skin color and background setting
as well as more subjective characteristics such as borrower attractiveness, perceived neediness, honesty and creditworthi-
ness. A standard set of coding instructions, found in the Appendix, was provided to each research assistant. We  trained the
research assistants by using a common set of borrower photographs. The coding for this common set was evaluated and
discussed with each research assistant before they proceeded to the full task.13
To reduce the possibility of research assistant bias contaminating our results, each photograph was  evaluated by a total
of four coders - one male and one female coder from Singapore and one male and female coder from Chicago. All coders
were undergraduates, and we ensured that the coders hired in each location reﬂected the majority demographics of that
country. In total, we engaged forty-one coders, as photographs were randomly assigned to coders, and each coder worked
independently, completing part of the entire dataset.14 For each of the physical and subjective characteristics, coders were
asked to rate the primary subject(s) in the photograph on a scale ranging from 1 to 7 or 1 to 10. In the case of a group loan,
the characteristics were coded for the entire group as a whole.15 For example, for the attractiveness rating, coders were
asked to rate the attractiveness of the person in the photograph on a scale of (1) very unattractive to (7) very attractive.
We implicitly assume, in constructing and coding these scales, that there are common standards for these physical and
subjective characteristics in the population (Biddle and Hamermesh, 1998). The literature on beauty has established that
people seem to agree on who is attractive and who is not and these common standards seem to apply quite broadly across
cultures and time periods (Langlois et al., 2000; Etcoff, 2000). Our procedure to rate the borrower’s physique is similar to
that for attractiveness, where coders are asked to place the person in the photograph on a scale from (1) very underweight
to (7) very obese. To assess borrowers’ skin color objectively, we instructed coders to base their assessment on the Massey
and Martin Skin Color Scale (2003) from the New Immigrant Survey, which provides a reference visual skin color chart, and
assigns a number from 1 to 10 for increasingly dark skin, with zero representing albinism.
Our deﬁnitions for the subjective borrower characteristics of perceived neediness, trustworthiness and creditworthiness
are adapted from Ravina (2012). To capture trustworthiness and honesty, coders were asked “if this person were to ﬁnd a
lost wallet on the street, do you think they would keep it for themselves, or try to return it (including the money)?” We
also ask coders for their impressions on how needy the borrower is and the extent they are deserving of a Kiva-type loan:
“suppose you were deciding whether to lend $25 (as part of a larger loan) to this person. Do you think this person is more
or less needy?” Finally, we ask coders to assess whether the individual appears to have the ability to repay a Kiva-type
loan – “suppose you were deciding whether to loan $25. How likely is it that this person will repay your loan instead of
default?” For each of the three questions, coders were asked to provide a rating on a scale ranging from (1) very likely to keep
wallet/deﬁnitely needy/very likely to default to (7) very likely to return wallet/deﬁnitely not needy/very likely to repay loan.
To generate a measure for each characteristic comparable across borrowers, we employed a ‘double standardization’
method. We ﬁrst standardized each coder’s scores by transforming their individual ratings for each characteristic to have
a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. This measure captures the extent to which each coder considers a given
borrower characteristic to be above or below average, based on the random subset of photographs they coded. We  then con-
structed a composite standardized score for each borrower characteristic, by averaging over all coders’ standardized ratings
13 Each research assistant was given a folder containing only the photographs of the borrowers. Research assistants were told about the general purpose
of  the study but were not provided with any information on the borrower’s context, loan description, purpose, or amount. The primary outcome of interest,
time  to funding, is not directly available publicly and must be calculated from the raw data.
14 We hired a total of 41 research assistants to code the photographs – 14 females and 15 males based in Singapore and 6 females and 6 males based in
Chicago. The research assistants from Singapore coded an average of 480 photographs each while the research assistants from Chicago coded an average
of  1160 photographs each.
15 In the event of substantial heterogeneity in the characteristics of the group members, coders were asked to provide an ‘average’ rating and to indicate
the  existence of signiﬁcant differences between group members in terms of the characteristic.
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Table  2
Summary statistics of physical and subjective characteristics (standardized measures) of borrowers.
All Individual Group By region of borrower
Africa Asia S America Others
Attractiveness 0.00 0.01 −0.10 −0.10 0.06 0.00 0.07
(1.00) (1.03) (0.78) (0.99) (0.98) (1.01) (1.04)
Physique 0.00  0.02 −0.11 −0.02 −0.26 0.40 0.30
(1.00) (1.04) (0.70) (1.04) (0.92) (0.94) (0.97)
Skin  Color 0.00 −0.05 0.32 1.29 −0.59 −0.56 −0.51
(1.00) (0.99) (1.00) (0.49) (0.50) (0.42) (0.71)
Smile  (1 = Yes, 0 = No) 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.36 0.46 0.55 0.43
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Neediness 0.00  −0.04 0.27 0.31 0.07 −0.33 −0.47
(1.00) (1.00) (0.95) (0.94) (0.97) (0.92) (1.00)
Trustworthiness 0.00  0.01 −0.06 −0.26 0.11 0.23 0.00
(1.00) (1.02) (0.86) (1.02) (0.93) (0.99) (1.02)
Creditworthiness 0.00  0.04 −0.25 −0.37 0.06 0.28 0.32
(1.00) (1.00) (0.94) (1.01) (0.93) (0.90) (1.03)
Observations 6853 5996 857 2096 2665 1103 989
Notes: Summary statistics are based on all loans posted on Kiva in June 2009. Missing observations are due to a small number of missing photographs
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and  photographs where key borrower characteristics could not be coded. The physical and subjective characteristics are standardized variables with mean
 and standard deviation 1, derived from coded assessments of the borrower photographs by our research assistants. The text describes the coding and
tandardization process in detail. Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis.
or that borrower characteristic, then transforming those average ratings to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of
ne based on all borrowers in the entire dataset.16 A one unit difference in each standardized borrower characteristic is thus
nterpretable as a one standard deviation difference in that characteristic’s composite rating. We  prefer this procedure over
aking the simple averages of ratings across coders as it controls for the possibility that each coder may  have a different
aseline scale. Our results are robust to our standardization methods and to inﬂuences from idiosyncratic combinations of
oders.17
Table 2 reports summary statistics of the physical and subjective characteristics of our sample, based on our composite
tandardized score. While there is considerable variation in these measures across borrowers and regions, the means and
tandard deviations of the variables are broadly similar, and reasonably consistent, across coders. The Cronbach alpha has
reviously been used in the literature on beauty to measure the consistency of ratings across different observers (Biddle
nd Hamermesh, 1998; Andreoni and Petrie, 2008). The alpha coefﬁcient ranges from 0 to 1 where a reliability coefﬁcient
f 0.70 or higher is generally considered “acceptable”. In our data, the Cronbach alphas for attractiveness, physique and
kin color are 0.67, 0.96 and 0.87, respectively. This suggests the standards of beauty held by our coders are more diverse
han standards for physical weight, or perceptions of skin color. While the alpha coefﬁcient for attractiveness is smaller
han most previous studies, this could be due to the fact that borrowers in our sample come from a much wider range of
ackgrounds.18 For the subjective characteristics, the Cronbach alphas are 0.67 for neediness, 0.56 for trustworthiness and
.57 for creditworthiness.19 Appendix Table 2 presents the correlations between the coded physical and subjective attributes
f the borrower, and the objective loan characteristics.
. Results
.1. Determinants of time to funding
In this section, we explore how borrower characteristics affect the speed of loan funding. We focus on three sets of
haracteristics: (1) hard information provided in the loan listing, (2) physical characteristics observed from photographs,
nd (3) subjective characteristics inferred from photographs. We  are interested in testing for evidence of discrimination –
hether a borrower’s physical attractiveness, physique and skin color affect how quickly their loans are funded, holding all
ther attributes of the loan constant. These other loan attributes, such as the purpose of the loan, loan amount requested, MFI
16 While each photograph was rated by 4 coders, a small number of photographs have only 3 valid ratings because of data entry errors or perceived
ifﬁculty in coding (research assistants were informed to leave entries blank if they felt they could not code the characteristic accurately). Results using
atings that require each photograph to have all four independent ratings are similar and reported in Appendix Table 1.
17 Regressions using non-standardized ratings obtain similar results, as do regressions that include ﬁxed effects for each of the 3625 coder-group
ombinations that assessed the data. The results are available from the authors.
18 The Cronbach alpha for beauty reported in Biddle and Hamermesh (1998) is 0.75, and 0.86 in Andreoni and Petrie (2008).
19 It is not surprising that the degree of agreement across coders for these subjective characteristics is lower than that for physique and skin color. This
s  consistent with Alesina and Ferrara (2002), who show that background factors play an important role in whether a coder ﬁnds someone trustworthy.
oreover, there is likely to be greater subjectivity in determining a borrower’s perceived neediness, trustworthiness and creditworthiness from photographs
lone.  Nevertheless, our consistency measures for trustworthiness and creditworthiness are similar to Ravina (2012).
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background, and so forth, are also important as they may provide information concerning default risks and social impact.
We begin by estimating regressions of the form:
Yi =  ˛ + Xi  ˇ + Zi + εi
where Yi is the log time to funding for each loan i, Xi is a vector that includes the physical characteristics and subjective
characteristics coded from the photographs, and Zi is a vector that includes all the other characteristics of the loan listing and
the borrower. The coefﬁcients are interpretable as the effect in percentage terms of a linear unit change in the coefﬁcient
on the time to funding.20 Objective loan characteristics Zi include gender, an indicator for whether the loan is to a group or
an individual, log of the loan amount, the repayment schedule in months, log GDP of the borrower’s country, the ﬁve-point
rating of MFI  quality and the average MFI  delinquency rate.21
In all our speciﬁcations, we control for region ﬁxed effects, ﬁxed effects for the day the loan was  posted and economic
sector ﬁxed effects. The physical characteristics of borrowers coded from the photographs include attractiveness, physique,
skin color and a dummy  variable that indicates whether the borrower is smiling. As discussed previously, the attractiveness,
physique and skin color scales are based on the composite score derived from the four independent coders. The subjective
characteristics of borrowers include perceived neediness, trustworthiness and creditworthiness. In the regressions that test
whether photo-based physical and subjective characteristics matter, we include additional ﬁxed effects for the borrower’s
country (44 countries), activity (126 categories within 15 sectors) and MFI  (86 ﬁeld partners). In the Appendix, we explore
additional speciﬁcations using more ﬂexible controls for the objective loan characteristics, as well as methods for measuring
the quality of borrower text descriptions. Estimates from our baseline model are robust to these additional speciﬁcation
checks (Appendix Tables 3A and B). As borrowers from the same country are more likely to possess correlated characteristics
– due to genetics, economic structure, etc. – our models are estimated using robust standard errors clustered at the country
level. The country level is also consistent with the general principle of selecting the coarsest level of clustering suitable for
the analysis (Cameron and Miller, 2015).
Our empirical strategy ﬁrst builds a preferred regression speciﬁcation, using the complete June 2009 sample of photo-
coded data, from the major components discussed above – objective loan, physical borrower, and subjective borrower
characteristics. We  then conduct sub-sample analyses by gender and by group vs. individual loans. These sub-sample analyses
have particular external relevance as group and gender-based lending is a key strategy of microﬁnance lenders such as the
Grameen Bank.
Our main results are presented in Table 3. Column (1) reports estimates of only the objective loan characteristics, while
(2) adds borrower physical characteristics and additional ﬁxed effects for country, activity, and MFI. (3) is our preferred
full speciﬁcation which additionally contains borrower subjective characteristics. Starting with the ﬁnancial characteristics,
larger loans take a longer time to achieve full funding – a 10% increase in the loan amount (about $70) increases time to
funding by about 13%. The estimate is stable across all speciﬁcations. While longer repayment terms increase time to funding
by about 7% per additional month, this coefﬁcient is not statistically signiﬁcant in (1). Borrowers from higher-GDP countries
take longer to receive full funding – but the estimates are not statistically signiﬁcant. Perhaps lenders believe social impact
is higher when lending to individuals in poorer countries. MFI  attributes produce mixed results. As expected, loans under
MFIs with high delinquency rates are funded slower, but MFIs with worse overall ratings actually receive funding for their
loans faster. One possibility is that low-rated MFIs might serve countries or certain groups of borrowers that lenders favor.
Group loans are funded faster than individual loans, but the effect shrinks and is insigniﬁcant with the inclusion of
borrower characteristics and additional ﬁxed effects in (2) and (3). Part of the group funding advantage could be operating
through the presence of groups in regions or activities that lenders prefer. Lenders strongly favor female borrowers – an
all-women group (results are similar for loans to individual women) is funded 65% to 81% faster than loans to an all-men
group. The gender effect increases as we add borrower characteristic controls, suggesting the preference is not just due to
lenders assessing women as possessing more favorable (codiﬁable) characteristics. We  discuss group and gender differences
in more detail in the next section’s sub-sample analyses.
Next, we explore the effect of photograph-observed personal characteristics on lending decisions, controlling for the
objective loan information included in (1). We  attempt to overcome typical omitted variable concerns that plague most
observational studies of discrimination by controlling for much of the same information observable to the lenders (Pope
and Snydor, 2011). In these speciﬁcations, we include a full set of ﬁxed effects that control for the borrower’s country of
origin, economic activity ﬁxed effects and MFI  ﬁxed effects. By including the country and MFI  ﬁxed effects we subsume all
the country-level and MFI-level covariates in (1) and also control for all the observed and unobserved characteristics of MFIs
that could be correlated with the borrower’s personal characteristics and the time to funding. We  ﬁrst analyze the effect of
the more objective physical borrower characteristics in (2), and we then add the subjective borrower characteristics in (3),
which is our preferred full regression speciﬁcation. In unreported regressions, we  have estimated separately the effect of
each borrower characteristic on time to funding, and also explored different combinations of borrower characteristics. The
results are broadly similar to those discussed below.
20 In our sample, all the loans were fully funded within the 30-day limit set by Kiva.
21 The gender variable, “Fraction Female,” is 0 or 1 for loans to individuals, and ranges from 0 to 1 for loans to groups.
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Table  3
The effect of borrower appearance and loan characteristics on funding time of loans.
Outcome: ln(time to funding)
(1) (2) (3)
Attractiveness −0.127*** −0.111***
[0.018] [0.024]
Physique 0.122*** 0.115***
[0.013] [0.013]
Skin  Color 0.060 0.075*
[0.043] [0.042]
Smile −0.060** 0.012
[0.026] [0.036]
Neediness −0.062***
[0.016]
Trustworthiness −0.118***
[0.042]
Creditworthiness 0.023
[0.024]
Age 0.004 0.005**
[0.003] [0.003]
Children in photo 0.094* 0.116**
[0.055] [0.053]
Group loan −0.306* −0.116 −0.098
[0.177] [0.242] [0.239]
Fraction female −0.650*** −0.814*** −0.775***
[0.126] [0.091] [0.090]
ln(loan amount) 1.344*** 1.303*** 1.297***
[0.091] [0.085] [0.085]
Loan  term (in months) 0.023 0.069*** 0.069***
[0.019] [0.015] [0.015]
MFI  risk rating (0–5 points) 0.180*** – –
[0.043]
MFI  delinquency rate 0.010* – –
[0.006]
MFI  default rate −0.028 – –
[0.295]
ln(GDP) 0.163 – –
[0.133]
Controls  for
Loan sector, region, posting day ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Country, economic activity, MFI  ﬁxed effects No Yes Yes
Observations 6853 6853 6853
R-squared 0.606 0.699 0.701
Notes: Each column is a separate linear regression. Column (1) is our main sample of Kiva loans from June 2009 with non-missing borrower photos and at
least  three independent ratings for each of the borrower physical and subjective attributes used in the study. Columns (2) and (3) uses the same sample
but  adds ﬁxed effects for country, economic activity, and MFI  partner, which require us to drop the MFI- and country-level characteristics. The physical
and  subjective characteristics are standardized variables with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. The text describes the coding and standardization process
in  detail. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parenthesis.
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We  ﬁnd strong evidence that borrower physical characteristics are associated with lender decisions even after controlling
xtensively for other characteristics of the loan. Lenders appear to strongly favor borrowers who  are more attractive, less
verweight and have lighter skin color, controlling for country of origin, sector, partner MFI  and other characteristics of the
oan. Based on (3), a one standard deviation (one unit) increase in assessed attractiveness is associated with a reduction in
ime to full funding of approximately 11%, while a one standard deviation increase in assessed physique (obesity) is associated
ith an increase in funding time of about 12%. For comparison, a ten percent increase in the loan amount requested, or about
70, is associated with an increase in funding time of about 13%. This implies borrowers who are one standard deviation
ore attractive (overweight) are treated by lenders as though they were asking for $60 less ($65 more). Funding times
re also signiﬁcantly lower for darker-skinned borrowers – a borrower one standard deviation darker is treated as though
hey are asking for $40 more. Compared to other physical traits, the results on skin color are weaker in terms of statistical
igniﬁcance, and more dependent on the model speciﬁcation. As a whole, these estimates showing apparent bias on the
asis of physical characteristics are signiﬁcant given that the average loan amount requested is about $700 in our sample.
We now examine the effect of subjective borrower traits – neediness, trustworthiness, and creditworthiness. Comparing
2) and (3), we ﬁnd that estimates of the effect of physical traits are minimally affected by the inclusion of these subjective
raits. Lenders appear to be independently considering both ‘outer’ and ‘inner’ beauty in their lending decisions. Greater
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Table 4
The effect of borrower appearance and loan characteristics on funding time of loans – subgroup analyses.
Outcome: ln(time to funding)
Individual
loans only
Group
loans only
Diff. between
(2) and (1)
Individual loans to Diff. between
(5) and (4)
Men  Women
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Attractiveness −0.109*** −0.105 0.004 −0.085* −0.115*** −0.030
[0.025] [0.066] [0.065] [0.050] [0.030] [0.057]
Physique 0.112*** 0.050 −0.062 0.104** 0.112*** 0.008
[0.014] [0.083] [0.078] [0.045] [0.015] [0.048]
Skin  color 0.101** −0.017 −0.119 0.105 0.099 −0.005
[0.047] [0.091] [0.099] [0.083] [0.061] [0.108]
Smile 0.049 −0.198* −0.246** 0.003 0.065 0.063
[0.037] [0.115] [0.103] [0.068] [0.041] [0.084]
Neediness −0.052*** −0.069 −0.017 −0.172*** 0.002 0.174***
[0.015] [0.064] [0.061] [0.024] [0.023] [0.033]
Trustworthiness −0.133*** 0.063 0.195*** −0.087** −0.146** −0.059
[0.046] [0.061] [0.067] [0.035] [0.055] [0.064]
Creditworthiness 0.016 0.032 0.016 −0.093** 0.064 0.157***
[0.027] [0.061] [0.064] [0.036] [0.038] [0.051]
Age 0.006** 0.003 −0.002 0.008 0.004* −0.003
[0.003] [0.008] [0.007] [0.005] [0.003] [0.006]
Children in photo 0.170** −0.053 −0.223* 0.110 0.173** 0.064
[0.064] [0.105] [0.118] [0.123] [0.067] [0.115]
Fraction female −0.763*** −0.988** −0.225
[0.087] [0.393] [0.366]
ln(loan amount) 1.390*** 0.786*** −0.605*** 1.185*** 1.443*** 0.258*
[0.091] [0.102] [0.132] [0.166] [0.069] [0.128]
Loan  term (in months) 0.064*** 0.065 0.001 0.051** 0.079*** 0.027
[0.016] [0.058] [0.057] [0.022] [0.016] [0.023]
Controls for
Loan sector, region, posting day ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country, economic activity, MFI  ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5996 857 6853 1376 4620 5996
R-squared 0.703 0.715 0.714 0.763 0.669 0.716
Notes: Each column is a separate linear regression. Column (3) reports the difference in coefﬁcients between Columns (1) and (2) and is based on a fully
interacted regression model containing all the data in both (1) and (2). Likewise, column (6) reports the difference between the coefﬁcients in Columns (4)
and  (5) based on a fully interacted regression model. The physical and subjective attributes are standardized variables with mean 0 and standard deviation
1.  The text describes the coding and standardization process in detail. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parenthesis.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
perceived neediness and trustworthiness of borrowers is associated with faster time to funding. The magnitude of these
effects is comparable to the effect of physical traits – a one standard deviation increase in the characteristic is associated
with a reduction in funding time of 6% (neediness) and 12% (trustworthiness) respectively. However, there is no signiﬁcant
effect of creditworthiness on time to funding, in aggregate (though creditworthiness is signiﬁcant in sub-group analyses,
discussed shortly).
The importance of neediness and trustworthiness to lenders on Kiva contrasts strongly with the literature on for-proﬁt
peer-to-peer credit markets, which generally ﬁnds that creditworthiness is the key subjective borrower trait. Ravina (2012)
ﬁnds that creditworthiness, but not trustworthiness, matters. Our results are quite comparable to Ravina (2012) as we use
the same methods of measuring creditworthiness and trustworthiness. Duarte et al. (2012) argue that trust matters, but
they use a measure of trust that actually includes a creditworthiness assessment. Therefore, we interpret their ﬁndings as
conﬁrming that creditworthiness matters to for-proﬁt lenders. Unlike the for-proﬁt market literature, we ﬁnd lenders on
Kiva mainly appear to care about whether the borrowers need the money and are trustworthy in general. In aggregate, our
evidence suggests creditworthiness matters less, conditional on other characteristics being accounted for in the model. This
reinforces the importance of treating charitable lending as a separate and distinct market from for-proﬁt lending. While
certain biases are shared between markets, such as preferences for beauty, other underlying motivations behind credit
decisions appear to diverge.
4.2. Subgroup analysesNow, we investigate how estimated effects of borrower characteristics depend on group status and gender. While we
found a slight preference for lending to groups earlier, here we  examine whether lenders treat a given group borrower
characteristic differently from the same individual characteristic. In columns (1) and (2) of Table 4, we estimate our preferred
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ull speciﬁcation on the data restricted to individual and group borrowers, respectively. Column (3) tests whether the
oefﬁcients in (1) and (2) are signiﬁcantly different, based on a fully interacted model. We  ﬁnd that estimates for physical
nd subjective characteristics are signiﬁcant for individual borrowers, but not for group borrowers. The magnitude and
irection of the estimated effects are broadly similar – (3) indicates coefﬁcients are only signiﬁcantly different for smiling
nd trustworthiness. Interestingly, the fact that trustworthiness is signiﬁcantly less important for group borrowers could
e consistent with the economic argument that joint liability and peer monitoring helps resolve individual moral hazard
roblems (Stiglitz, 1990; Besley and Coate, 1995; Ghatak and Guianne, 1999). However, we  caution that our estimates likely
uffer from measurement error in the group borrower characteristics. While we asked our coders to rate each group’s average
haracteristics, lenders may  actually be considering other aspects of a group’s characteristic distribution. Therefore, in the
ubsequent analyses following this sub-section, we  base our estimates solely on individual borrower data, which forms the
ulk of our data in any case.
In columns (4–6) of Table 4, we perform the same analysis, now split by gender rather than group status. We ﬁnd
o gender differences in the effect of physical characteristics, with more attractive and less overweight borrowers similarly
dvantaged regardless of gender. We  do ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences in the subjective characteristics. While greater neediness,
rustworthiness and creditworthiness signiﬁcantly reduce funding times for men, only trustworthiness matters for women.
ender differences are particularly large for neediness and creditworthiness – the point estimates indicate almost no effect
f neediness for women, but a substantial 17% reduction in funding time for a male borrower who  appears one standard
eviation needier. These results are interesting in light of the literature showing that the social impact of microﬁnance
n children’s consumption, labor supply and household ﬁnances, is larger when women  are borrowers, not men  (Pitt and
handker, 1998). Lenders who seek to maximize social impact could be targeting women  in general (and ignoring differences
cross women borrowers in perceived neediness), as well as selectively lending to more needy and more creditworthy men.
.3. Probability of loan default
Here, we examine whether the observed patterns of bias are caused by lender statistical discrimination. The statistical
iscrimination hypothesis predicts that lenders will be biased against observable borrower characteristics because those
haracteristics are correlated with underlying default risks. Kiva classiﬁes as delinquent loans with one or more payments
ast due, while a loan is classiﬁed as defaulted if six months elapse on a past due loan without full recovery of the loan
mount. As of September 2011, 1.8% of loans were either delinquent or defaulted. One reason for Kiva’s low default rate is
hat MFIs may  cover non-performing loans in order to maintain their low average default rates. While this practice is currently
rohibited by Kiva, it was allowed from 2006 to 2009. Nevertheless, under the statistical discrimination hypothesis what
hould matter to lenders is the overall likelihood of default, and whether the observable characteristics of borrowers are
redictive of default.
Table 5 reports linear probability model (1–2) and logit (3) estimates of the relationship between loan default and the
hysical and subjective characteristics of borrowers, controlling for the same loan characteristics as in Table 3.22 The linear
robability model used in column (1) is based on the full regression speciﬁcation in Table 3. The logit model in column (3)
eports marginal effects estimated at the mean of the independent variables, and omits ﬁxed effects because of insufﬁcient
ariation in default rates within many of our ﬁxed effect categories. For comparison with the logit model, we include a linear
robability model omitting ﬁxed effects in column (2).23
As observed from columns (1–3), we ﬁnd little evidence that any photo-based characteristics are predictive of default.
he appearance-based characteristics of attractiveness, physique and skin color, are not signiﬁcantly associated with loan
efault in all speciﬁcations. The subjective photo-based characteristics of neediness, trustworthiness and creditworthiness
re also not associated with default. There is no evidence that default rates differ by gender, although female borrowers
ttract funding much more quickly. We  do not think our statistically insigniﬁcant ﬁndings are just due to the low default
ates in the data – we are able to identify that higher loan amounts are associated with a lower probability of default in column
1). Thus, the evidence suggests there is no statistical relationship between discriminated-against borrower characteristics
nd the actual probability of default.
Appendix Tables 4A and B report several robustness checks for our results in this section. To address the concern that
ur estimates are biased toward zero by the baseline low probability of default, we  use the ‘rare events’ adjustment for the
ogit model proposed by King and Zeng (2001). We also incorporate the inﬂuence of ﬁxed effects by ﬁrst regressing each
orrower characteristic of interest on the set of ﬁxed effects, then using the resulting residuals in place of the borrower
haracteristic variables in our logit models. Results from the robustness checks are qualitatively similar and indicate little
nﬂuence of borrower characteristics on loan default rates. We  acknowledge a remaining limitation is that MFIs may  repay
efaulting loans. We  can rule out the case where MFIs non-strategically repay all defaulting loans – defaults do exist and are
22 As a conservative estimate, we code loans that are currently delinquent as having defaulted. As shown in Table 1, virtually all of the loans that are not
epaid  had defaulted, with only a very small number recorded as another status (approximately 0.1% of all loans were delinquent). The results are virtually
dentical if we  only focus on loans that have defaulted.
23 The absence of ﬁxed effects in columns (2–3) also provides a parsimonious model of statistical discrimination that reﬂects the case where lenders make
ecisions mainly on the observable characteristics of borrowers rather than on the ancillary characteristics captured by our ﬁxed effects.
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Table 5
The effect of borrower appearance and loan characteristics on loan default.
Outcome: loan default
Linear probability model Logit – Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3)
Attractiveness −0.001 −0.003 −0.0002
(0.001) (0.003) (0.0002)
Physique 0.001 −0.002 −0.0002
(0.001) (0.005) (0.0002)
Skin  color 0.003 0.002 0.0004
(0.002) (0.007) (0.001)
Smile −0.002 −0.003 −0.0005
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001)
Neediness −0.002 −0.002 −0.0002
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001)
Trustworthiness 0.001 −0.002 −0.0005
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001)
Creditworthiness −0.001 −0.008 −0.0007
(0.001) (0.006) (0.001)
Age 0.000 −0.000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.0000)
Children in photo −0.003 −0.003 −0.0007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001)
Female −0.001 0.018 0.0018
(0.003) (0.018) (0.002)
ln(loan amount) −0.008* 0.008 0.0011
(0.004) (0.007) (0.001)
Loan  term (in months) 0.005 0.006 0.0005
(0.003) (0.004) (0.0005)
Controls for
Loan characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Loan  sector, region, posting day ﬁxed effects Yes No No
Country, economic activity, MFI  ﬁxed effects Yes No No
Observations 5954 5954 5954
R-squared 0.724 0.084 0.412
Notes: The sample is restricted to individual loans only. Columns (1) and (2) report estimates from separate linear probability models. Column (3) reports
the  marginal effects at the mean of the independent variables from a logistic model. The sample includes all individual loans in our data sample that
have  available default status. Column (1) uses the same set of regressors as the individual loans model in Table 4. Columns (2) and (3) differ by excluding
ﬁxed  effects for loan sector, region, loan posting day, country, economic activity, and MFI. Instead of these ﬁxed effects, the MFI  rating, MFI  default rate,
MFI  delinquency rate, and ln(GDP) of the borrower’s country are included in (2) and (3). Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in
parenthesis.
***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
**Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*Signiﬁcant at 10%.
signiﬁcant for some MFIs. However, we do not have strong a priori justiﬁcations for formulating and testing any particular
model of strategic MFI  repayment behavior.24 We  caution that defaults may  be a noisy measure because of unobserved MFI
repayments.
4.4. Differences across sectors
Next, we consider an alternate statistical discrimination test that is more robust to both unobserved MFI  repayment
behavior and low underlying default rates. This test assumes instead that lenders discriminate because they wish to maximize
enterprise productivity and output, rather than just loan repayment performance. We  believe this is a reasonable assumption
since Kiva’s published default rates are quite low, so lenders wishing to statistically discriminate may  have considered more
carefully potential output rather than default rates. The test requires identifying a borrower characteristic variable that
is plausibly a priori associated with differential business productivity. We  believe the most suitable variable is physical
attractiveness.
24 For example, strategic MFIs might preferentially repay loans of borrowers known to be favored by lenders, to avoid ‘killing the golden goose’. But it
is  also possible that strategic MFIs preferentially repay loans for less-favored borrowers if conﬁrming negative stereotypes would greatly reduce funding
access for those borrowers. The optimal strategy depends on the elasticity of lender money supply with respect to defaults. We do not have clear grounds
for  making assumptions regarding these parameters. Finally, MFI strategic behavior (if it exists) is likely to be heterogeneous, since MFIs differ widely in
the  types of borrowers they service.
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Table 6A
More attractive borrowers sort into customer-facing economic sectors.
Outcome: attractiveness
(1) (2)
Services 0.193** 0.127**
[0.078] [0.055]
Construction, mfg  and transport −0.008 −0.028
[0.051] [0.038]
Food −0.090 −0.042
[0.055] [0.026]
Agriculture −0.045 −0.094**
[0.066] [0.039]
Retail Omitted category Omitted category
Observations 5257 5257
R-squared 0.023 0.324
Controls for
Borrower characteristics Yes Yes
Loan  characteristics No Yes
Country, day, MFI  ﬁxed effects No Yes
Notes: The sample is restricted to individual loans in the listed economic sectors only. Each column is a separate linear
regression with attractiveness as the dependent variable. Each regression includes dummy  variables for the following
sectors: services; construction, manufacturing and transport; food; and, agriculture. The retail sector is the omitted
category. “Borrower characteristics” consists of gender, age, and presence of children. “Loan Characteristics” consists of
the  loan amount and loan term. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parenthesis.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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The beauty literature shows that relatively attractive individuals sort into customer-facing occupations such as sales and
ervices, and earn premiums correlated with their attractiveness in these occupations (Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994; Pfann
t al., 2000). A lender who statistically discriminates with the aim of funding enterprises that are more likely to be highly
roductive should therefore be more willing to fund attractive borrowers in customer-facing businesses. By contrast, the
xtent of standard taste-based discrimination should be invariant to enterprise type, as the potentially higher output of a
ore attractive borrower in a customer-facing enterprise should be less relevant. Although a similar test applies in principle
or other physical characteristics, lighter skin color and lower weight is not associated with higher productivity as generally
s beauty itself. For example, while low physical weight may  indicate good self-control and higher productivity, higher
hysical weight may  be a productive characteristic in a physically demanding enterprise.25
Accordingly, we concentrate on investigating whether the effect of attractiveness on time to funding varies across ﬁve
ajor economic sectors – Agriculture, CMT  (Construction, Manufacturing and Transport), Food, Retail, and Services. These
ve sectors account for 85% of the loans in our sample. Retail, Services, and Food (retail food) are more obviously customer
acing sectors where attractiveness may  allow an entrepreneur to be more successful. However, productivity in Agriculture
nd CMT  are less obviously linked to attractiveness.
We ﬁrst document evidence of beauty-based sorting by borrowers on Kiva into different occupations. Table 6A presents
he results of regressions of the borrower’s attractiveness on industry sector dummies. Column (1) includes other borrower
haracteristics, while (2) additionally includes loan characteristics and the full set of ﬁxed effects used in our main regres-
ion models. The results in Table 6A show that borrowers in Services are more attractive, by an average of 0.127 to 0.193
tandard deviations, than those in Retail (the baseline). Borrowers in Food, CMT, and Retail are statistically similar in terms
f attractiveness, though the point estimates for Food are somewhat lower. Agriculture is associated with less attractive
orrowers than Retail. The evidence is consistent with some degree of sorting by attractiveness, with the more attractive
orrowers entering Services, followed by Retail and CMT, then Food, then Agriculture.
In Table 6B, we examine whether the relationship between attractiveness and time to funding depends on the borrower’s
ndustry. If lenders statistically discriminated to maximize productivity, we  would expect greater effects of attractiveness
n Services and Retail. Panel A reports how the effect of attractiveness on time to funding varies by industry sector, using the
ain regression model run separately on each industry sector. Then, in Panels B and C we  test whether differences in the
ttractiveness coefﬁcient between sectors are statistically signiﬁcant. Speciﬁcally, Panel B reports the difference between
he effect of attractiveness in that industry and Retail, while Panel C reports the difference relative to Services. The estimates
n Panels B and C are obtained from a fully interacted regression model with Retail and Services as the baseline sectors,
espectively.
25 We have conducted the same differential enterprise type analysis described in this section for physique and skin color and ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant
ifferences across industry sectors in their effect on time to funding. The results are reported in Appendix Tables 5A and B.
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Table 6B
The attractiveness premium does not depend on whether borrowers are in customer-facing economic sectors.
Sector Outcome: ln(time to funding)
Retail Services Construction, Mfg. and tpt. Food Agriculture
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Coefﬁcient of attractiveness by economic sector
Attractiveness −0.110*** −0.305*** −0.303*** −0.220*** −0.161***
[0.031] [0.093] [0.093] [0.037] [0.031]
Observations 1438 450 393 1838 1138
R-squared 0.706 0.745 0.801 0.678 0.784
Panel B. Difference in Coefﬁcient of Attractiveness Compared to Retail Sector
Attractiveness (3)–(1) (4)–(1) (5)–(1)
−0.193** −0.111*** −0.052
[0.089] [0.033] [0.045]
Observations 1831 3276 2576
R-squared 0.724 0.698 0.742
Panel C. Difference in coefﬁcient on attractiveness compared to services sector:
Attractiveness (3)–(2) (4)–(2) (5)–(2)
0.002 0.085 0.144
[0.148] [0.085] [0.092]
Observations 843 2288 1588
R-squared 0.772 0.693 0.774
Controls for
Loan and borrower characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan  sector, region, posting day ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country, economic activity, MFI  ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The sample is restricted to individual loans in the listed economic sectors only. Each column in Panel A is a separate linear regression with log time
to  funding as the dependent variable for each separate subsample of the data corresponding to the sector of the loan. Each regression uses the same set
of  regressors as that of the individual loans model in Table 4. Panel B reports the difference in the coefﬁcient of attractiveness relative to the retail sector
(column (1)). Panel C reports the difference in the coefﬁcient relative to the services sector (column (2)). Standard errors clustered at the country level are
reported in parenthesis.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
The results in Table 6B show that differences in the attractiveness premium across industry sectors do not support
a model of statistical discrimination based on attractiveness as a proxy for productivity in customer-facing enterprises.
Panel B shows that the attractiveness premium for CMT  and Food is larger than that of Retail. Although Food is also a
customer-facing sector, it is unclear why the attractiveness premium for Food should be superior to that of Retail – and smaller
than that of CMT. The attractiveness premium in CMT is particularly large; borrowers in CMT  who  are one standard deviation
more attractive are fully funded 19 percentage points faster than similarly attractive borrowers in Retail. Panel C shows the
attractiveness premium for Services – which the most attractive borrowers sorted into – is not signiﬁcantly different from
that of CMT, Food, and Agriculture. While Services does have the largest attractiveness premium point estimate, overall,
there is no consistent evidence that attractiveness matters more for industry sectors that are more customer facing.
5. Experience, market power, and lender biases
The results in the preceding section show that lenders appear to discriminate on the basis of borrowers’ physical attributes,
and that such behavior is not readily explained by statistical discrimination. We  cannot completely reject the general hypoth-
esis that discrimination is motivated by the predicted effect of observable physical attributes on the social impact of loans,
because we lack data on measurable social impact. However, our analysis of the available data provides evidence against
both statistical discrimination based on default risk and statistical discrimination based on physical characteristics as a proxy
for enterprise productivity.
Assuming that statistical discrimination does not explain our results, our ﬁndings are consistent with explicit or implicit
discrimination by charitable lenders. While explicit (or taste-based) discrimination can be modeled as a conscious utility
maximizing choice (Becker, 1979), implicit discrimination may  result from unconscious thought processes or attitudes
(Greenwald and Banaji, 1995; Greenwald et al., 1998). Implicit discriminators may  not even be aware of their discriminatory
behaviors, which are more likely to be exhibited under time pressure, stress and cognitive load (Bertrand et al., 2005).
Cognitive load may  be the most relevant factor driving implicit discrimination on Kiva, because of the extremely large
choice set available – there are hundreds or thousands of borrowers seeking funds. Evidence from multiple domains shows
that decision making under ‘choice overload’ often results in qualitatively worse outcomes, ranging from reduced satisfaction
and willingness to purchase goods (Iyengar and Lepper, 2000), to reduced tolerance for risk and complexity (Iyengar and
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Table  7A
Summary statistics of lender data at the loan-level.
No. of Obs. Mean Std Dev
Number of lenders per loan 6977 20.24 21.75
Number of lenders per loan (individual loans only) 6104 17.21 17.79
Length  of time as Kiva lender (months) 54,865 14.75 9.62
No.  of previous loans made 54,865 16.54 93.53
Table 7B
Loans to beautiful borrowers are more likely to be funded by less experienced lenders.
Average lender characteristics of loan
Number of previous loans made Length of time as Kiva member (months)
Attractiveness −27.113*** −0.184***
[6.542] [0.062]
Physique 22.262*** 0.076**
[6.707] [0.035]
Skin color 5.660 −0.035
[18.810] [0.102]
Smile 28.451** 0.259**
[13.625] [0.105]
Neediness −16.958 −0.184***
[10.265] [0.068]
Trustworthiness −19.396* −0.128*
[9.954] [0.074]
Creditworthiness −6.634 −0.017
[12.829] [0.069]
Age 1.359** 0.006
[0.659] [0.009]
Children in photo −23.082 −0.190
[27.638] [0.152]
Female −92.274*** −0.034
[16.554] [0.151]
ln(loan amount) −21.429 0.964***
[23.585] [0.081]
Loan term (in months) −8.208* −0.032**
[4.584] [0.016]
Controls for
Loan sector, region, posting day ﬁxed effects Yes Yes
Country, economic activity, MFI  ﬁxed effects Yes Yes
Observations 5988 5988
R-squared 0.263 0.242
Notes: The sample is restricted to individual loans which have information on lenders available. Each column is a separate linear regression with the average
characteristics of lenders at the loan-level as the key dependent variable. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parenthesis.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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amenica, 2010). Indeed, one common mental response to ‘too many’ choices or too much information is to reduce cognitive
urden by using simplifying decision heuristics, such as stereotyping (Rothbart et al., 1978; Bodenhausen, 1990).
Our ﬁrst test for the presence of implicit discrimination is based on the hypothesis that experience with a task reduces
he extent to which implicit biases affect decision making. Familiarity with the implicit association test is known to
onsistently and robustly reduce test effect sizes across populations and in a variety of settings (Nosek et al., 2005).26
lthough experimental psychologists argue prior experience confounds measurement of the ‘true’ level of implicit bias, we
rgue this ﬁnding suggests that experience with a choice task may  reduce a decision maker’s implicit biases, or at least
educe the extent to which implicit bias affects choices made. Therefore, if implicit discrimination explains the patterns
f bias in our data, we should ﬁnd that more experienced lenders exhibit less discrimination in their lending behavior. By
ontrast, standard preference-based explanations for discrimination have no obvious correlation with experience.
26 The implicit association test (IAT) is a widely used measure of the strength of implicit associations. A test-taker is asked to associate stimuli (e.g., faces or
ords) with categories (e.g., good, bad). The hypothesis is associations are made more quickly when the stimuli is implicitly related in the test-taker’s mind
o  the concept (e.g. African-American faces with ‘bad’ categories), relative to the cases where the stimuli are mentally unrelated (e.g. African-American
aces  with ‘good’ categories). A full description of the test is found in Greenwald et al. (1998).
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Table 8
The effect of competition on the extent of lender bias toward physical characteristics of borrowers.
ln(time to funding) Average lender characteristics of loan
Number of previous loans made Length of time as Kiva member (months)
(1)  (2) (3)
Attractiveness*No. of competing loans (per 100) −0.008 −5.475** 0.008
[0.012] [2.229] [0.039]
Physique*No. of competing loans (per 100) −0.023 −0.999 0.026
[0.015] [4.999] [0.030]
Skin Color*No. of competing loans (per 100) 0.053** 12.729* −0.018
[0.022] [6.724] [0.030]
Smile*No. of competing loans (per 100) −0.024 −1.898 −0.106
[0.035] [8.866] [0.068]
No.  of competing loans (per 100) 0.099*** 38.994*** −0.111***
[0.027] [11.759] [0.039]
Attractiveness −0.122*** −37.255*** −0.197**
[0.027] [7.862] [0.081]
Physique 0.120*** 20.336*** 0.068
[0.024] [6.267] [0.040]
Skin color 0.097** 1.542 0.031
[0.040] [16.797] [0.124]
Smile 0.059 41.994** 0.301***
[0.038] [17.755] [0.111]
Neediness −0.049** −17.906* −0.191**
[0.024] [9.880] [0.085]
Trustworthiness −0.171*** −31.718*** −0.119
[0.032] [8.910] [0.076]
Creditworthiness 0.042* −2.152 −0.066
[0.023] [12.993] [0.070]
Controls for
Loan and borrower characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Loan sector, region ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Country, economic activity, MFI  ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5996 5988 5988
R-squared 0.580 0.127 0.095
Notes: The sample in column (1) is restricted to individual loans only, while the sample in columns (2–3) is further restricted to loans with available lender
information at the loan-level. Each column is a separate linear regression. Column (1) has log time to funding as the dependent variable while (2–3) have
average characteristics of lenders at the loan-level as the dependent variable. “Loan and borrower characteristics” consist of age, presence of children,
female  dummy, loan amount and loan term. The “No. of competing loans” is measured over a 24 hour period and is scaled such that a one unit increase in
the  variable represents an increase in 100 competing loans from the mean. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parenthesis.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
Our analysis uses loan-level measures of lender experience and borrower characteristics as the units of observation,
rather than lender-based measures.27 For each loan, we  construct two  measures that summarize the experience level of
that loan’s lenders: (1) the average number of loans made by lenders, and (2) the average number of months that lenders
have been Kiva members. Table 7A reports summary statistics for the lenders in our data, showing that the average lender
made about 17 previous loans and had 15 months of experience on Kiva. In Table 7B, we regress these two  measures of
loan-level lender experience separately on borrowers’ physical and subjective attributes, controlling for the relevant loan
characteristics as found in the baseline regressions.
Overall, the results in Table 7B show that relatively inexperienced lenders are more likely to lend to more attractive and
less overweight borrowers. Skin color is not signiﬁcantly related to lender characteristics, all else constant. Less experienced
lenders also tend to fund borrowers who appear more needy and trustworthy. Interestingly, female loans are favored by less
experienced lenders. These results suggest that lenders’ experience may  alleviate bias toward the physical and subjective
attributes of borrowers, consistent with ﬁndings that prior task experience reduces measurable implicit associations.
For our second test, we contrast the predictions generated by models of discrimination (explicit vs. implicit) under
varying degrees of competition or market power. Explicit discrimination can be modeled as a non-pecuniary cost of market
interaction (e.g. hiring, trading) with a discriminated-against group (Becker, 1979). Because these non-pecuniary costs are
determined by the strength of prejudice, rather than the proﬁtability of the market transaction, explicit bias can be competed
away as less-prejudiced ﬁrms enter the market, and as markets become more competitive. For example, Theseira (2008)
27 A lender-based analysis requires reconstructing for each lender a full loan history, coding every past loan for that lender. The magnitude of data required
far  exceeds that of our present analysis. Our present data only contains the loan history of very inexperienced lenders who  have completed all their lending
within  the month of June 2009. Unfortunately, a lender-based analysis is outside the scope of this paper, but is an important area for future research.
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hows that as competition intensiﬁes amongst peer-to-peer lenders, interest rates fall more sharply for African-American
orrowers than for White borrowers. Accordingly, if explicit discrimination explains our results, we expect to ﬁnd that
arket power alters the magnitude of discrimination. A null effect of market power on discrimination suggests instead that
ur results are not readily explained by explicit discrimination.28
To proxy for relative market power on Kiva, we measure the aggregate demand for credit from borrowers, as we  lack
ood measures of credit supply by lenders. Aggregate credit demand at the loan level is measured as the total count of
ther loans posted during a 24-hour window, centered on the time that a given loan is posted.29 We  de-mean and scale the
redit demand measure so that a one-unit difference is interpretable as the effect of a 100-count change in the number of
ompeting loans. The average loan faces 317 competing loans, with a standard deviation of 214.
In Table 8, we examine how relative credit demand affects the extent of bias. We  focus on bias toward attractiveness,
hysique and skin color, as these are more relevant to the literature and have the most consistent effects on time to funding in
ur data. Column (1) is based on the full regression speciﬁcation from Table 3, augmented with the credit demand measure,
nd interaction effects between credit demand and borrower characteristics. However, we exclude group loans, and exclude
ime-related ﬁxed effects due to correlation with our credit demand measure. Column (1) shows that as relative demand
or credit increases, so does time to funding – an additional 100 competing loans increases funding time by about 10%.
owever, credit demand generally does not affect the extent of bias. The interaction effects of the credit demand measure
re signiﬁcant only for skin color, where greater relative demand for credit exacerbates the effect of darker skin color on
ncreased time to funding. While the results could suggest lenders are explicitly biased against darker skin, they are less
upportive of explicit bias as an explanation for the effects of attractiveness and physique.
We next replicate the lender experience regressions from this section, augmented with the credit demand measure
nd interactions with borrower characteristics. As measures of loan-level lender experience, column (2) uses the aver-
ge number of loans, while column (3) uses months on Kiva. Our main interest is in the interaction effects of credit
emand, which show in (2) that periods of greater choice are associated with even lower experience levels amongst
enders to more attractive and lighter-skinned borrowers.30 This is consistent with the argument that the relatively
igh cognitive burden from choice overload may  increase the likelihood of implicit discrimination by inexperienced
enders.
Overall, this section’s evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that implicit discrimination explains the patterns of bias
e document on Kiva. There is some evidence for explicit discrimination as an explanation for the effects of skin color on time
o funding, but not for the effects of attractiveness and physique. We  cannot completely rule out alternative models where
aste-based or statistical discrimination is reduced by learning. However, models of explicit discrimination with learning
enerally assume a setting where agents are both highly motivated to learn and have access to high quality information to
pdate their priors – as in the labor market (Altonji and Pierret, 2001). Our setting does not obviously fulﬁll these criteria.
 lender-based analysis would be a fruitful area for future research.
. Conclusion
This paper documents systematic discrimination by charitable lenders in favor of borrowers who are more attractive,
ess overweight and lighter-skinned. Lenders also favor borrowers who appear more needy, honest and creditworthy. These
stimates are economically signiﬁcant: a one standard deviation increase in assessed borrower attractiveness, physique and
kin-color is equivalent to asking for a loan amount of approximately $60 less, $65 more and $40 more, respectively, relative
o the average loan amount of approximately $700.
We ﬁnd little evidence that these patterns of bias are explained by statistical discrimination. Borrower physical traits
o not predict loan default, and the beauty premium is not signiﬁcantly higher in industries where beauty might be a
roxy for business productivity, such as Services. We  lack the data to directly test whether statistical discrimination occurs
ecause borrower physical traits predict the eventual social impact of loans. However, studies show that less attractive, more
verweight and darker-skinned individuals are denied opportunities in the labor market and in traditional credit markets
Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994; Cawley, 2004; Pope and Snydor, 2011; Hersch, 2008). If anything, providing charitable
unding to these discriminated-against groups should yield higher, not lower, social returns.Since statistical discrimination does not readily explain our results, we believe lenders are displaying simple prejudice –
xplicit or implicit – on the basis of borrower physical traits. We ﬁnd tentative evidence consistent with implicit discrimina-
ion against less attractive and more overweight borrowers. More experienced lenders appear to exhibit less bias, consistent
28 We acknowledge that our tests will not conclusively distinguish between explicit and implicit discrimination. If market power implies greater choice,
he  cognitive constraints that cause implicit discrimination might be magniﬁed. However, the link between market power and explicit discrimination is
ell-established in the literature. A null result, at the least, is inconsistent with explicit discrimination explaining our ﬁndings.
29 We use the 24-hour window because the median time to funding is less than a day. However, there is little difference in the effective variation of the
redit  demand measure if we  use alternate time windows, or use the total amount requested from competing loans instead of the loan count. Results using
 48-hour window, a 72-hour window, and using the total amount requested by other loans are available from the authors.
30 The interaction effects of credit demand are statistically signiﬁcant using the prior loan measure of experience, but not when using the length of time
n  Kiva measure. Overall, we  believe lender experience may  be better measured using prior loans, since a member can belong to Kiva for a long time but
et  have little actual lending experience.
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with evidence from the implicit association test that shows task familiarity reduces the strength of implicit associations
(Nosek et al., 2005). Moreover, we ﬁnd that increased credit demand does not magnify prejudice against less attractive and
more overweight borrowers – contrary to predictions from standard models of explicit discrimination. In fact, during periods
of high credit demand, inexperienced lenders appear to exhibit even more bias – consistent with the cognitive burden from
additional choices increasing reliance on implicit mental processes. We  acknowledge competing explanations exist, such as
statistical discrimination models where lender preferences are updated through learning. Implicit discrimination remains
an important area for future work, particularly since we conjecture many charitable donors would express discomfort with
the idea that beauty or skin color should determine how charitable assistance is allocated.
We add to a growing literature that shows discrimination on the basis of physical attributes also affects charitable sett-
ings. However, our evidence is becoming more relevant as online directed giving or ‘crowdfunding’ continues to grow.
Microﬁnance institutions or charities that rely on individual giving may  respond to lender biases by avoiding less ‘attrac-
tive’ borrowers or clients, regardless of creditworthiness or social impact. Direct philanthropy may  thus be less efﬁcient
at allocating resources to maximize social impact, compared to traditional modes of giving where development experts
make investment decisions based on presumably technocratic factors (Desai and Kharas, 2009). Nonetheless, the scale and
magnitude of direct giving through Kiva and other platforms has the potential to be a remarkable force for development
assistance. Increasing public awareness of the existence of aggregate patterns of discriminatory behavior may  do much to
ameliorate lender biases, particularly if such biases are implicit (Pope et al., 2013).
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.jebo.2015.06.004.
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